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The Conflict in former Yugoslavia as a
« Fault Line War » ?
Testing the validity of Samuel Huntington’s « Clash of Civilzation »
Florian Bieber
 
Introduction
1 Samuel Huntington’s article « The Clash of Civilizations ? », published in Foreign Affairs in
Summer 1993, resulted in heated debates to an extent rarely seen in response to an article
in academia1.  Three years later the book with the same title,  bar the question mark,
appeared, followed by a renewal of the controversial debates. While his book as been
meet  mostly  with  criticism in  the  academic  world,  it  managed to  successfully  enter
mainstream  political  discourse  like  few  other  “scientific”  theories.  The  appeal  of
Huntington’s theory is the attempt to develop an all-encompassing theoretical construct,
which aims at explaining not only the conflicts of the present and future, but also at
describing the key features of the international political system. As far as it also touches
upon  inner-state  conflicts,  its  implications  reach  beyond  international  relations.
Huntington’s  theory  is  also  the  academic  articulation  of  a  number  of  more  crude
journalistic explanations for conflicts between the West and mainly the Islamic world, as
well as in former Yugoslavia2.
2 At the center of  Huntington’s  theory stands the concept of  civilization.  He describes
conflicts between civilizations as the prime source of conflict after the end of the Cold
War. Civilization describes the way of life of a group. Huntington thus places civilization
above narrower terms such as nation or language. At the center of Huntington’s concept
of civilizations stands religion :« To a very large degree, the major civilizations in human
history have been closely identified with the world’s great religions ; and people who
share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other, as happened
in Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia, and the Subcontinent »3.
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3 It  lies  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  to  present  a  general  analysis  or  critique  of
Huntington’s clash of civilizations. The war in Bosnia and elsewhere in former Yugoslavia
nevertheless can be seen as a good tool for the testing the validity of the theory and
detecting mistakes. This is partly because he himself offers Bosnia as an example of one of
his key concepts, “fault line” wars. Furthermore, the Bosnian war superficially seems to
fit nicely into concepts developed by the political scientist at Harvard. This papers aims at
highlighting the  fundamental  flaws  in Huntington’s  theory  in  regards  to  Bosnia  and
former Yugoslavia. In particular it will point out how the author neglects nationalism as a
driving force for conflict. Furthermore, just like civilizations, nationalism as a reason for
conflict  is  neither monolithic  nor could it  be described as  a  simple cause and effect
relationship. Instead nation, as well as civilization, might serve as a mobilizing ideology
for conflict.
4 Finally one will have to highlight how dangerously close Huntington comes to being an
apologist for ethnic cleansing, and how he presents a grossly distorted picture of Islam,
especially in the case of Bosnia.
 
False Fault Line Wars
5 In the forefront of the analysis offered in Clash of Civilizations stand conflicts between the
leading  countries,  so-called  core  countries,  of  each  civilization.  He  nevertheless  also
devotes attention to the aforementioned fault  line wars.  These wars involve nations,
people or other groups of different civilizational provenance. Although such wars can be
carried out between countries, Huntington underlines the fact that such conflicts are
more likely to occur inside states which bridge different civilizations (cleft states). These
conflicts are characterized by longer duration and more violence than interstate warfare.
The war in Bosnia is put into this category of civilizational conflicts by the author4. These
wars are potentially more dangerous than other wars, according to the theory of the Clash
of Civilizations, as they inevitably draw in the kinsmen of both opponents (see chapter on
« Civilizational  Brotherhood »).  As  with global  civilizational  conflicts,  also  these  local
wars mainly focus on the religious component of civilizations : « Some analysts downplay
the significance of this [religious] factor. They point, for instance, to the shared ethnicity
and  language,  past  peaceful  coexistence,  and  extensive  intermarriage  of  Serbs  and
Muslims in Bosnia, and dismiss the religious factor with references to Freud’s “narcissism
of  small  differences”.  That  judgement,  however,  is  rooted  in  secular  myopia »5.  The
author rightfully mentions the fact that all inhabitants of Bosnia share the same language
and the same ethnic origins. Nevertheless a war broke out which defined itself upon the
differences between the inhabitants of this country. Thus Huntington seems to be correct
when assuming that religion consequently has to be the main cause for conflict.  The
difference in religion during the course of the war has lead a division of the language, a
division of the territory and the questioning of common ancestry, or as Radovan Karadžić
compared Serbs and Croats with cats and dogs : « You can’t keep a dog and a cat in a box
together. Either they would always be quarreling and fighting or they would have to stop
being what they are »6.
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The Absence of Nationalism
6 The Clash of Civilizations makes in this context (as in the whole text) suspiciously little
mention of nationalism. Huntington subsumes nationalism under the greater category of
civilization and sees it as a more specific component of the larger concept. By completely
ignoring nationalism as a cause of the war in Bosnia, Huntington seems oblivious to the
development of nation states and nationalism in this region of Europe in the past 200
years. While at the beginning of the 19th century the prime identifying characteristic of
the  different  populations  in  Bosnia  and  the  Balkans  was  religion,  it  has  since  been
replaced  by  nationality.  Nationalism  and  nations  in  general  contain  religious
components, and more specifically in the case of Serbs, Croats and Muslims, the prime
difference  (besides  a  partially  different  historical  development)  was  religion.
Nevertheless, it would be false to claim religion to be the main dividing element between
Croats,  Muslims  and  Serbs.  The  difference  between  the  three  groups  is  the  sense  of
belonging to three different nations. While it would lead beyond the scope of this paper to
highlight the “ingredients” of nations and nationalism, it will suffice at this point to bear
in mind that they constitute a highly complex mixture of perceived common historical
experience,  a  development  of  common  consciousness  and  the  perception  that  the
unifying elements outweigh the commonalties with other (usually neighboring) nations.
Religion is an important component in such a differentiation from the other, especially in
cases where other criteria, such as language or ethnic origins, are identical. In this light
one has to bear in mind that while Serbian nationalism differs from Croatian nationalism
primarily by religion and different perceived historical experience, the difference with
Bulgarian or for that matter Macedonian nationalism is not based on religion, but on
language. And, needless to mention, Serbia and Bulgaria have had numerous national
conflicts in the past. To single out the recent war in Bosnia and Croatia as being a new
phenomena  and  expression  of  civilizational  conflict  means  ignoring  the  history  of
national conflicts in the region and ignores the proper context of the war7.
 
The Difference Between Perception and Reality
7 The war in Bosnia is  justified as a “fault  line” war by the appropriation of  religious
grounds for conflict by the Croat, Serb and Muslim leaderships, and they have frequently
described their  opponents in such (mostly derogatory)  terms8.  While this  component
played an important role in the demonization of the opponent during the war, it was
merely one element. Thus, reducing the stereotypes used during and before the war to
merely  religious  or  civilizational  factors  simplifies  the  broadness  and  multi-
dimensionality of the supposed “otherness”. Furthermore Huntington does not draw a
clear line between the perception of civilizational difference and the real content of the
presupposed opposition.  Along these lines,  if  one where to take the rhetoric of  most
communist  regimes  during  the  cold  war,  conflicts  (e.g.  Vietnam)  were  usually  the
expression of class struggle, either internally or on the global scale of conflict between
the  socialist  and  capitalist  countries.  Despite  this  given  explanation,  few  serious
academics  would  maintain  that  these  wars  were  truly  such  class  struggles,  even  if
perceived  as  such  by  one  side.  This  failure  to  differentiate  between  the  given  and
perceived reason for conflict in Bosnia (and other cases mentioned by Huntington as
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civilizational  conflicts)  gives  rise  to  the  objection made  by  Maria  Todorova  that
Huntington’s theory resembles a prescription rather than a prediction9.
 
The Civilizational Brotherhood
8 Samuel  Huntington  assumes  that  not  only  international  relations  but  also  internal
conflicts  will  be  shaped  increasingly  by  confrontations  between  civilizations.  Other
explanations  for  such  conflicts,  such  as  economic  factors,  receive  at  best  secondary
attention of the author. He does not deny the possibility of intra-civilizational conflicts,
but  grants  them less  importance  as  they  are  less  likely  to  lead to  broader  conflict :
« Violence between and groups of  different civilizations,  however,  carries with it  the
potential for escalation as other states and groups from these civilizations rally to the
support of their “kin countries” »10.
9 One of the dangers of civilizational conflicts according to Huntington is the involvement
of ”kin-countries” of the groups fighting the fault line wars. The involvement of “kin”
leads in his view to a widening of the conflict and also brings the danger of tensions or
even conflict between the larger civilizational groups. The allies of the conflicting parties
in their civilization can also help restrain their warring kin and negotiate with the other
civilizational group.
 
National Interest Determines “Civilizational Alliances”
10 In his critique of Huntington’s article in Foreign Affairs Foud Ajami reminds the reader
that states are still the central unit of international relations and their kin ties are only
mobilized for their one usefulness : « Civilizations do not control states, states control
civilizations.  States  avert  their  gaze  from  blood  ties  when  they  need  to ;  they  see
brotherhood and faith and kin when it is in their interest to do so »11. In this light one can
analyse the supposed kin-relationship between Muslims, Serbs and Croats and their kins.
11 Huntington groups all Muslim countries together, even such different states as Libya,
Turkey  or  Iran.  While  some might  share  the  same anti-Western  policy,  it  would  be
difficult to claim that Libya is a Islamist country, bearing in mind that its leader Ghaddafi
seeks  to  promote  Arab socialism and suppresses  Islamists  in  his  own country.  Their
support  for  Bosnia,  if  granted,  was  thus  more driven by national  interests  than any
civilizational affinity. Furthermore, the support of most Muslim countries was symbolic
to  the  point  of  being  limited  to  rhetoric  expressions  of  sympathy  with  the  Bosnian
Muslims,  and accusations addressed to the passivity of  the “West”.  The only country
granting military aid on a significant scale was Iran (with the tacit consent of the United
States). Although Iran is a Muslim state, the difference between the Shia regime in Tehran
and  the  secular  Sunni  Muslims  of  Bosnia  is  so  obvious  and  stark  that  the  primary
intention even of Iran was more likely to be the expansion of its sphere of influence than
the establishment of  a  Muslim state12.  Turkey,  the only country with close historical
connections  to  Bosnia,  limited  its  support  mostly  to  the  spectacular  visit  of  prime
minister  Tansu  Ciller  to  Sarajevo  in  1993  and  lobbying  for  Bosnia  in  international
organizations.  Huntington clearly  overestimates  the role  of  the Muslim world and is
fooled by the rhetoric of many Muslim countries13.
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12 One of the explanations offered by Huntington for the propensity for conflict among
Muslim countries is  the absence of  a clear center (core state)  of  Islam,  which would
organize and discipline the Muslim world. Besides the dubious quality of such a dominant
power, it would also mean that only a Muslim core country could assume a supporting
role for the Muslims of Bosnia, which would not only be divisive for Bosnia, but also
utterly inadequate for the Muslims of Bosnia, who have sought and maintained cultural
ties with Europe and not with the Muslim world for an extended period of time14.
13 German, Austria and the Vatican are then named as the supporters of the Slovenian and
Croatian quest for independence, while the Orthodox civilization supposedly supported
Serbia15. While Germany and Austria did support Croatia and Slovenia during the early
stages of the war (later to be largely replaced by the United States), one could ask why the
equally Catholic and Western country France (or Great Britain for that matter) had little
inclination  to  support  the  independence  of  either  republic.  Furthermore,  among
Orthodox countries there was no unified support for Serbia. Relations with Macedonia
remained tense, and Romania did not engage in any substantial support for its “kin”. The
“notorious” Greek and Russian support, although voiced by supporters and opponents
with  great  vigor,  remained  rather  limited.  In  key  matters,  such  as  sanctions,  both
supported the general Western position16. Other non-civilizational consideration weighed
much more. Their own minorities, and their real or possible quest for secession, limited
the support for independence among some countries (e.g. France), while the support of
others is due to economic interest, large diaspora groups or historical ties17.
14 As much as countries determine civilizations, the state plays great influence in shaping
the loyalties of its population. These loyalties were defined primarily along national lines,
not only in former Yugoslavia. In some cases, as in Bosnia, national identity overlaps with
religion. Nevertheless, a Bosnian Muslim will primarily identify himself as a member of
the Bosnian Muslim Nation. This identity defines itself not so much in adherence to a
transnational  umma,  but  rather as  a means of  separating oneself  from Croat  or Serb
national identity18.
 
The Similarities Across Civilizational Fault Lines
15 These observations lead to the more general question of whether it  is permissible to
divide the nations of Bosnia into different civilizations and to describe the conflict as a
fault line war. All three nations of Bosnia have been part of the same historical, cultural
and geographical experience of the Balkans. Despite the linguistic and religious diversity
of  the  region,  it  can  be  considered  as  a  viable  area19.  The  key  components  which
Huntington attributes  to Western civilization ;  the classical  heritage,  Catholicism and
Protestantism,  European  languages,  the  separation  of  state  and  church,  rule  of  law,
pluralism, individualism and representative institutions have been mostly as much or as
little part of the formation of all of the national groups of Bosnia20. The Catholic, western,
Croats in Bosnia have not been exposed to substantially more of these elements than the
Islamic Bosnian Muslims or the Orthodox Serbs. They share the same history of the past
centuries, although not necessarily the perception of history21.
16 The usage of the term civilization in this context is thus misleading. Civilizations are so
complex  that  hardly  any  direct  empirical  relationships  can  be  drawn.  Essentially
Huntington’s theory in the case of Bosnia seems to be rather a “Clash of Religions” than a
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civilizational confrontation22. The dangers of the religious analysis of Huntington shall be
seen subsequently in the evaluation of his portrayal of Islam.
 
The Image of Islam
17 Particularly striking in the Clash of Civilizations is the attitude towards Islam and Muslims.
In his analysis of the main sources of conflict in these clashes he singles out the Islamic
civilization as the greatest destabilizer. The key term he uses in his article for Foreign
Affairs in 1993 (and reiterates in his book) are the “bloody frontiers” of Islam, which he
supplements by the equally bloody Binnenland of Islam23. According to him the biggest
problem of Islam is the West, and for the West it is Islam, « a different civilization whose
people  are  convinced  of  the  superiority  of  their  culture  and  are  obsessed  with  the
inferiority  of  their  power »24.  Not  only  is  Clash  of  Civilizations riddled  with  sweeping
generalizations about Muslims and Islam, his overly enthusiastic usage of these leads to
many factual misconceptions.
18 Frequently he attributes the label Muslim to societies which could hardly be described as
such. Huntington, for example, frequently refers to the “Albanian Muslim” population in
the context of Kosovo and Albania proper, where the equation of Muslims and Albanians
is hardlly permissible. The majority of the Albanians in Kosovo are Muslim, but this does
not hold true for the whole Albanian population and does not take into account the
thoroughly secularized Albanian society in Kosovo25.
19 In the Clash of Civilizations stereotypes of Muslims are common place. Huntington claims,
for example, that Islamism transformed « Bosnia from the Switzerland of the Balkans to
the Iran of the Balkans »26. It seems difficult to claim that Bosnia was the Switzerland of
the Balkans, but even more demagogic to claim a parallel with Iran. The usage of “Iran”
attempts to evoke the negative images the reader has of that country, without properly
dissecting them.
20 In his conclusions he criticizes American policy towards the Balkans, and arrives at the
position  that  « [p]ursuing  the  chimera  of  a  multi-civilizational  country,  the  Clinton
administration denied self-determination to  the  Serbian and Croatian minorities  and
helped to bring into being a Balkan one-party Islamist partner of Iran »27.  It does not
require profound knowledge of the course of the war and the reasons for its outbreak to
spot the clear anti-Islamic bias28.
21 The two central components of Huntington’s view of Islam, in particular with regard to
former Yugoslavia, deserve further analysis : the demography of the Muslim population,
where he distorts the real demographic facts in favor of his theory, and the supposed
Islamic “fundamentalism” in Bosnia.
 
Demography of Muslims
22 When Huntington elaborates his  thesis  of  the “bloody borders of  Islam” he seeks an
explanation (among other factors) in demography. The fundamental point made is the
that the higher birth rate among Muslims has laid the foundations for conflict.  This
“demographic explosion” created a large population under 30 years of age, which was
more ready than old generations to violently enforce their demands. This increase in
Muslim  population  also,  according  to  Huntington,  created  rightful  fears  of  Muslim
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dominance among their non-Muslim neighbors. With respect to the war in Yugoslavia, he
names  the  Albanians  of  Kosovo  and  the  Muslims  of  Bosnia  as  examples  of  such  a
development.
23 With regard to Kosovo, he only mentions the drop of Serb population between 1961 and
1991 from 24 % to 10 %, and the parallel rise of the Albanian population from 67 % to
approximately  90 %29.  He  fails  to  mention  that  the  relationship  between  Serbs  and
Albanians had remained relatively stable between 1948 and 1961 and only then clearly
changed. The high birth rate of Albanians, although a fact, was not the only reason for the
increasing discrepancy. Between the two censuses in 1971 and 1981 the birth rate among
Albanians was double of the Serbs in the Province, which obviously accounts for some of
the higher proportion of the Albanian population. The key nevertheless is the emigration
of Serbs from the province, which cancelled out the positive growth of the Serbs30. The
explanation  given  in  Clash  of  Civilizations attributes  this  to  the  Albanian  growth  in
population, discrimination and persecution against Serbs. The author in no way attempts
to  provide  evidence  for  these  claims,  which were  under  much dispute  in  the  1980s.
Obviously a great increase of the emigration rate of Serbs coincides with the increase of
autonomy for Kosovo granted through the constitutional amendments of 1971 and the
subsequent new constitution of 1974. The consequence of this was a shift away from Serb
predominance over the region, to an increased Albanian participation. Although this also
led to instances of discrimination, it would be to simplistic to overestimate this factor. A
study carried out by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1985-1986 has examined
the emigration of Serbs (and Montenegrins) from Kosovo. Of the emigrants questioned
67,2 % of the respondents gave reasons largely unconnected to Albanian “persecution”,
such as general  uncertainty,  inability to find a job,  social  climate and their children.
These factors ring true for nearly all underdeveloped regions, including Kosovo. National
discrimination and similar reasons account for less than a third of the reasons given in
this study31. Thus even a study sympathetic to the arguments of Huntington cannot verify
his claim.
24 With regard to Bosnia, Huntington’s explanation of the increase in Muslim population is
even less acceptable as a reason. He points out the increase in the Muslim population
between 1961 and 1991, from 26 to 44 % of the population, during which period the Serb
population dropped to 31 from 43 %32. Such a simple comparison of figures is completely
impermissable in relation to the Muslim population of Bosnia. As their status changed
considerably  between the  end  of  the  world  war  and  the  1980s,  each  census  carried
different  implications.  In the 1948 Muslims could declare themselves only as  Muslim
Serbs,  Croats  or  “nationally  undecided”  Muslims.  In  1953  not  even  this  option  was
available,  while  in  1961  the  option  to  describe  themselves  as  “ethnic  Muslims”  was
introduced. Only from 1971 onwards did Muslims in Yugoslavia have the option to declare
themselves  as  “Muslim  in  the  national  sense”.  This  development  coincided  with  a
significant change in the relationship between the state and the Muslims. Only after the
fall of Ranković,  and the end of domination by the centralist faction in the League of
Communists, was Muslim identity encouraged and fostered by the state. Due to the still
unclear status of Muslims in 1961, many opted to declare themselves as “Yugoslavs”. 87 %
of all “Yugoslavs” lived in Bosnia, and 84 % of those were Muslims. Taking these factors
into  consideration  together,  the  increase  between  1961  and  1991  in  the  Muslims
population was only from approximately 33 to 44 %. In absolute numbers the Muslim
population increased in these three decades by approximately 800 000, while the number
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of Serbs stagnated and the Croat population grew only slightly33. While this increase is
still noteworthy, it is by no means as extreme as Huntington presupposes, and cannot
justify his statement : « ethnic expansion by one group led to ethnic killing by the other »
34.
25 The key factor in Bosnia which Huntington fails to see is not the demographic increase of
the Muslim population, but the increased politicization of the Muslims. This increased
political  influence,  a  consequence  of  the  promotion  of  Muslims  in  the  1960s  to
counterbalance  the  Serb-Croat  antagonisms,  made  other  nations  worry  about  their
predominance. 
26 Huntington ends his chapter on the demographic development with the elaboration of
four  proposed  reasons  for  the  higher  likelihood  of  conflict  involving  Muslims :
militarism ; the perception of being a victim among Muslims ; the demographic factor and
the incapability of Muslims and their religion to “digest” non-Muslim population.  All
these arguments sound scaringly like the arguments put  forward by Serb nationalist
extremists during the war in Bosnia. The great capability of the secular Muslims of Bosnia
to  coexist  with  non-Muslim  populations,  the  absence  of  militarism,  even  after  the
outbreak of the war and the true victim status of Muslims in Bosnia are lightly ignored by
the  author35.  Along  these  lines  the  “Minister  of  Information”  Velibor  Ostojić  of  the
“Repulika Srpska” claimed : « Islam is rising everywhere. Christian Lebanon and Cyprus
have fallen already. Furthermore Muslims reproduce very quickly »36.
 
Muslim Fundamentalism
27 While Huntington observes a  general  turning away from multinational  life  in Bosnia
towards  extremism,  he  sees  this  development  among  Muslims  as  being  “even  more
marked” than among Serbs and Croats. The fact that Izetbegović is a “devout Muslim”
contributes  little  to  justifying  this  claim,  just  as  his  brief  quotes  from  his  Islamic
Declaration lacks any contextualization and explanation. This Declaration clearly points out
that no Islamic state should be established in a state which is not in a majority populated
by Muslims (thus Bosnia is  excluded).  Furthermore,  it  is  rather a critique of  corrupt
regimes in Muslim states and of their policies, than a call to establish Islamic states. (In
fact, neither Bosnia nor Yugoslavia are mentioned in the declaration).
28 What is  more,  Huntington’s interpretation of  the SDA’s electoral  victory as a sign of
Islamism cannot be upheld. At the time the SDA encompassed a multitude of factions in
the spectrum of Muslim intellectuals. It is necessary to point out that Fikret Abdić,  a
buisnessman and member of the former communist nomenklatura, received more votes for
the presidency in 1990 than did Alija Izetbegović, which clearly demonstrates the limited
support among Bosnia’s “Muslims” for a religious policy.
29 While it is correct that Serbs and Croats were increasingly excluded from the institutions
in  government-controlled  areas,  and an attempt  began to  create  a  separate  Bosnian
language,  ignoring the circumstances in which these developments took place makes
Huntington  an  apologist  for  the  crimes  committed  by  Serb  and  Croat  armies.  The
complete exclusion,  persecution and murder of  Muslims preceded any of  the actions
mentioned by Huntington. Also, the division of the Serbo-Croatian language into Serbian
and Croatian took place before the establishment of a Bosnian language.  The actions
taken by the government of  Bosnia thus were a  reaction to much harsher measures
already implemented by the Serb and Croat statelets in Bosnia. The fact that Serbs and
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that Muslim nationalism was far less extremist and largely a reaction to its Serb and
Croatian counterparts37. The radicalization of Muslims during the war should not be seen
as unusual, given the circumstances of Croat/Serb control of up to 80 percent of Bosnian
territory, and the more extreme policies pursued by some Muslim leaders can not or
should not be reduced to the nature of Islam, but rather to the state of war.
30 In his argument, however, Huntington follows the line of many Serbian apologists who
attempt at justifying the campaign launched by the Bosnian Serb army against Bosnia in
April 1992 as a reaction to Islamist policies38.
 
Civilization and Religion as a mean of political
mobilization
31 As has been shown by the above analysis, religion and civilization do not constitute the
kind of source of conflict,  which Huntington attributes to them. Both rather serve as
instruments of nationalist ideology and its proponents in achieving their goals39. Within a
group,  internal  differences  and conflicts  can be  pasted over  by religious  or  national
mobilization. This process of national identity formation is twofold. One side it requires
an inclusive definition of its members. Secondly, it necessitates an exclusion, creating a
separation from other,  usually  neighbouring  groups.  This  self-definition,  however,  is
subject to change according the internal needs of the group and its external balance of
power in relationship to others :
We should also be aware of the temporal dimension through which the complex
process of reconstituting traditions and activating collective memories occurs. And
finally, we need to think about collective identities in their spatial dimension : in
the present context we might think of nations and ethnies that aspire to have states
or forms of autonomous rule in an area of territorial concentration.40
32 The national groups in Bosnia, as elsewhere, do not constitute monolithic units, they are
rather divided into a multitude of social and economic differences. Elites can cover up
these  differences  through  manipulating  the  subjective  adherence  of  the  group  to
nationalism,  or any other powerful ideology, and thereby enhance its influence over this
community. National and religious aims help to legitimize its proponents, and removes
them from conventional accountability for their policies. Every opposition to the leaders
can be interpreted as treacherous.
33 Religious and national factors also serve to delimit oneself from others. This separation is
only feasible, as long as the other group is clearly identified and classified as “alien”41. In
terms of distancing oneself as far as possible from neighbours, religious justifications can
often be more helpful than national ones. As most religions encompass a larger area than
nations,  they  help  create  a  greater  distance  between neighbours.  From the  national
position Muslims can only be presented as “alien” to a limited degree. When national
rhetoric is supplemented by religious arguments, however, this enables the nationalists
to  represent  the  Muslims  as  being completely  alien  and  oriental.  While  national
arguments can at best mentally displace Muslims to Turkey,  religious arguments can
alienate them to places as far away as Iran or the Arab world42. From here it is only a
small step to accuse the other group as being an “agent” of this foreign civilization. Along
these lines Croats were represented as a “Trojan horse” of the Vatican or the Muslims of
Iran. These supposed ties are similar to Huntington’s supposed ties with the so-called
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“kin-countries” of the local conflicting parties. Although such contacts existed at times,
their perception by other groups has been of greater importance. The intensity of the
conflict in Bosnia was largely caused by perceptions of “otherness” and these constructed
or real alliances greatly helped to underline these supposed differences43.
34 The theory of the Clash of Civilizations also neglects the mutual enhancement of national
identities through conflict. At the origins of this vicious circle national identities have
frequently been consciously or unconsciously mobilized by politicians or other members
of the elites for their own political or material benefit. Huntington and other authors
have  thus  confused  civilizational  fault  lines  with  nationally  constructed  differences,
which are subject to change, according to the historical situation :
Balkan strife has re-emerged not just because of cultural differences, but because
crises  of  modernization  which  have  not  run  their  course  re-emerged  with  the
collapse of communism. Everywhere, the arrival of modernity creates stresses for
social and political organization : a modern state must be built amidst the remnants
of a traditional society ; exposure to market forces imposes the pain of adjustment;
old and new élites vie for leadership of politically activated masses44.
35 Warren Zimmermann, the last US ambassador to Yugoslavia, underlines the conscious
manipulation of historical facts by politicians in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia. For their own
legitimization current conflicts are projected into the past and thus appear “ancient” and
inevitable.  In reality most current conflicts in former Yugoslavia have their roots in the
19th century and in most cases lead to violence only during World War II, while some of
the most bloody fighting before took place between the Orthodox “kins” ;  Serbia and
Bulgaria during the second Balkan War. At the same time other regions of the world
suffered from no less intense wars (e.g. the frequently forgotten American Civil War),
without  this  justifying a  source of  conflict  today or  proving the impossibility  of  life
together45. The way in which Huntington presents the conflict in former Yugoslavia could
be described as an extension of Oritentalist discourse, as outlined by Edward Said or,
more narrowly, as segment of the Balkanism, which Maria Todorova describes :
In  the  face  of  persistent  hegemonic  discourse  from  the  West,  continously
disparaging about the Balkans, which sends out messages about the politization of
essantialized cultural differences (like the Huntington debate), it is hardly realistic
to  expect  the  Balkans  to  create  a  liberal,  tolerant,  all-embracing  identity
celebrating ambiguity and a negation of essentialism46.
36 While the theory of Huntington seems appealing at first sight, and after a superficial
glance at the papers’ headlines seems the appropriate explanation for the war in former
Yugoslavia, it fails on several levels. Not only is the empirical and anecdotal evidence he
provides shaky and riddled with mistakes, but also his approach is very ahistorical and
lacks key elements for the understanding of the region. The absence of nationalism in
Huntington’s  theory  is  hard  to  justify,  especially  as  he  provides  no  justification  or
evidence for a possible switch from national to civilizational loyalties47. Finally, he fails to
make a  clear  differentiation between the perception of  differences  and their  reality.
While it  is  easy to dismiss the theory of  Huntington,  one should not overestimate it
enormous influence beyond academia and see it as a reflection of a multitude of far less
refined opinions not uncommon in many levels of Western (and other) societies.  The
Clash of Civilizations is also clear evidence of the dangers of any attempt to create a global,
all-encompassing theory, whether of international, conflicts or internal strife.
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ABSTRACTS
The case of "former Yugoslavia" serves as a tool to test the validity of Huntington's theory. The
author's aim is to highlight the fundamental flaws in his theory in regards to Bosnia and "former
Yugoslavia", in particular by pointing out Huntington's neglect of nationalism as a driving force
for conflict and his distorted picture of islam (especially in the case of Bosnia).
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